Sharing Resource Wealth: What Mongolia's National Wealth Fund Can Learn from Norway, Chile, Botswana and Alaska

Mongolia today

Mongolia has passed its fund law, opened an account for every citizen, and was named one of the most improved funds internationally. The spending rule, independence of management, and distribution from major deposits are still unsettled.

Item	Status
Law	Parliament passed the National Wealth Fund Law on 19 April 2024 (MLSP)
Structure	Future Heritage Fund, Development Fund, Savings Fund; renamed the Chinggis Fund in December 2024 (Wikipedia)
Savings Fund sources	34% of dividends from Erdenes Mongol mining subsidiaries plus special royalties from private miners (swf.gov.mn)
Citizen accounts	One for each of 3.6 million citizens; about US$49 each as of December 2025; locked until 2030 (GlobalSWF)
Total assets	About US$2.3 billion (GlobalSWF)
International rating	GSR governance score rose from 12% to 44%; named most improved fund of 2026 (GlobalSWF)
New proposal (May 2026)	Bill requiring at least 60% of benefits from strategic deposits to reach citizens through the fund, with a regulatory fee if the share falls short (MI24)
Oyu Tolgoi	Rio Tinto 66%, Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi 34%; the 2022 agreement waived US$2.4 billion of debt; about 500 kt of copper a year in 2028–2036 (Rio Tinto 20-F, Mining News)

Main risk. An Open Society Forum policy brief points to the earlier failures of the Human Development Fund, the Development Bank and the SME Support Fund (OSF No. 50). The lesson of the four models below is not how to create a fund but how to protect one.

Research framework: the 12-chapter template

Every country is studied under the same 12 chapters, so any two countries, and Mongolia, can be compared line by line. This report focuses on chapters 6 (revenue management) and 7 (benefit distribution).

No.	Chapter	Key question
1	Legal and constitutional basis	Who owns the subsoil, and how are licences granted?
2	Fiscal regime	What share of profit does the state take, and how stable are the terms?
3	State participation	Does the state hold equity, and how are state companies governed?
4	Investment agreements	Are contracts published, and are they renegotiated?
5	Company structure and finance	JV design, loans, transfer pricing
6	Revenue management	Funds, fiscal rules, stabilisation
7	Benefit distribution	National, regional, local and citizen shares
8	Local content and processing	Jobs, suppliers, in-country processing
9	Land, water, environment, closure	Herders' pasture, water rights, closure guarantees
10	Transparency and accountability	EITI, beneficial ownership, audits
11	Infrastructure and logistics	Rail, ports, exports from a landlocked country
12	Consent and dispute resolution	How citizens, companies and state settle disputes

Each country section ends with "What Mongolia can copy" and "What doesn't transfer directly."

Norway: never spending the capital

Norway takes 78% of petroleum profits in tax, puts its revenue into the world's largest fund, and each year spends only the expected return (3%). It has topped the resource governance index (Compliance Week).

Chapter	What Norway does
2. Tax	22% ordinary tax plus 71.8% special tax, for a 78% marginal rate; petroleum tax revenue estimated at NOK 291.5 billion in 2026 (Norsk Petroleum)
3. State company	The state owns 67% of Equinor, which is run on commercial terms; the stake is managed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Norsk Petroleum)
3. Direct stake (SDFI)	Direct state holdings in fields and pipelines, managed by Petoro (about 80 staff); net cash flow about NOK 193 billion in 2026 (Norsk Petroleum)
6. Fund	Government Pension Fund Global: about US$2.5 trillion (October 2026) (Wikipedia)
6. Fiscal rule	Over time the structural non-oil deficit should equal the fund's real return (3%, cut from 4% in 2017); more can be spent in downturns, less in upturns (Norsk Petroleum, Norges Bank)
7. Distribution	No cash payments; transfers from the fund finance about 27% of the 2026 central government budget, reaching citizens through public services (Government of Norway)

What Mongolia can copy

• Legislate the withdrawal as a fixed percentage, so politicians stop fighting over how much to take each year.
• Separate state ownership from commercial management: the ministry owns, a professional board runs the company.
• A small, professional Petoro-style holder for state stakes, which runs no mines and only oversees the state's share.

What doesn't transfer directly

• Mongolia has to build its institutions while the revenue is already flowing.
• A 78% rate fits highly profitable offshore oil, not Mongolia's copper and coal deposits and investment risk profile.

Chile: the closest copper-country model

Since 2001 Chile has budgeted on the long-term copper price and saved the surplus in a stabilisation fund; since 2023 it shares royalty revenue with regions by formula. Its copper sector ranked 2nd of 89 assessments, and state-owned Codelco ranked 1st among state companies (NRGI 2017).

Chapter	What Chile does
2. Royalty (2023)	For producers above 50 kt of copper a year: a 1% ad valorem tax plus a margin-based tax; maximum effective rate of 46.5% for producers above 80 kt (DLA Piper, LatinNews)
6. Fiscal rule	Structural balance rule: spending is set by the revenue the state would earn at potential GDP and the long-term copper price (BIS)
6. Independent inputs	Independent expert committees set potential GDP and the long-term copper price; the Fiscal Council observes (World Bank)
6. Fund	Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES), founded 2007 with US$2.58 billion; US$3.9 billion at end-May 2026 (Hacienda, Dipres)
6. Use	Drawn down in bad years instead of borrowing; in 2024, three withdrawals of US$800m, US$607m and US$1,000m (Hacienda)
7. Regional sharing	US$450m a year from the royalty: US$225m regional development fund, US$170m territorial equity fund for the poorest municipalities, US$55m for mining municipalities (InvestChile)
7. Results	In April 2024, CLP 93.6 billion transferred to 307 municipalities with over 12 million residents (Mining Reporters)

What Mongolia can copy

• Budget on long-term copper and coal prices set by an independent expert committee, not the Ministry of Finance.
• Split a fixed share of royalties three ways by formula: all aimags, the poorest soums, and soums affected by mining (for example Khanbogd and Tsogttsetsii).
• Publish state mining company reports to Codelco's standard.

What doesn't transfer directly

• Chile's rule rests on 20+ years of an independent central bank and a professional finance ministry; Mongolia should first protect the price committee's independence in law.
• Chile has seaports; Mongolia's exports depend on borders and rail, which adds logistics risk on top of price swings.

Botswana: the joint-venture model and the diversification lesson

Botswana did not nationalise its mines. It formed a 50:50 joint venture with De Beers (Debswana) and shares the profit through tax, dividends and royalties. But the diamond slump since 2024 has shrunk the economy two years running, showing the risk of depending on one commodity.

Chapter	What Botswana does
3. Joint venture	Debswana runs the Jwaneng, Orapa, Letlhakane and Damtshaa mines; government and De Beers own 50% each (Jewellery News)
4. Renegotiation	Under the deal concluded in February 2025, state-owned Okavango Diamond Company's share of output starts at 30% and reaches 50% within 10 years (previously 25%); licences extended to 2054 (IDEX, Jewellery News)
8. Diversification fund	De Beers puts US$75m into a Diamonds for Development Fund, potentially US$750m over 10 years (Jewellery News)
6. Fiscal rule	Sustainable Budget Index (since 1994): recurrent spending outside health and education must be covered by non-mineral revenue, so mineral revenue goes to investment (CCSI, Daily News)
6. Savings	NDP 11 proposed saving 40% of mineral revenue for future generations and investing 60% in development (WAVES)
Slump (2024–2026)	Economy shrank 3% in 2024 (IMF); 2025–26 mineral revenue of BWP 10.3 billion, under half the historic average (Your Botswana); debt projected to breach the 40% legal ceiling (BusinessDay)

What Mongolia can copy

• Instead of the state running mines, form equal joint ventures with experienced partners who supply professional management.
• Negotiate marketing rights, not just equity: the right for Mongolia to sell a set share of copper and coal concentrate itself.
• When extending agreements, require fixed contributions to a diversification fund.
• An SBI-style rule that recurrent spending is covered by non-mining revenue.

What doesn't transfer directly

• Botswana built 50 years of stable partnership with one investor; Mongolia's relations with foreign investors have been less stable, so contract trust must be rebuilt first.
• Botswana's biggest lesson is a warning: dependence on diamonds and lapses in its own rules let the budget deteriorate fast.

Alaska: a direct dividend to every citizen

Alaska created its fund by constitutional amendment in 1976 and has paid every resident an annual cash dividend since 1982. It is the closest model to Mongolia's Savings Fund, and both its strengths and weaknesses apply directly.

Chapter	What Alaska does
1. Law	The fund is established in the state constitution (Art. IX, sec. 15); 25% of mineral lease rentals and royalties flow into it (Alaska Legislature)
6. Fund	Over US$85 billion, the largest sovereign fund in the US (BusinessWire)
6. Spending rule	Annual draw of 5% of the fund's five-year average market value (POMV) (BusinessWire)
7. Citizen dividend	US$1,200 per person in 2026 (US$1,000 dividend + US$200 energy relief), paid from 1 October (Alaska Beacon, Cronista)
7. Weakness	Since 2017 the dividend size has been fought over by legislators every year; fund earnings now pay for 50–60% of state operations (ADN, Juneau Empire)
7. Politicisation	Since 2020, dividends have been larger in election years than in non-election years (Juneau Empire)

What Mongolia can copy

• Lock the fund's revenue source (a fixed royalty share) into the constitution or law.
• Calculate withdrawals as a fixed percentage of five-year average assets, so one bad market year does not swing citizens' benefit.
• Write the citizen dividend formula into law and take it out of the annual budget fight.

What doesn't transfer directly

• Cash risks becoming an election tool; given Mongolia's experience with Human Development Fund cash handouts, keeping the current focus on housing, education and health is sensible.
• Alaska has a small population and a large fund; Mongolia's per-citizen balance is still small, so accumulating first works better than paying out cash.

Comparison table

Against the four models, Mongolia's biggest gaps are the spending rule and a local-sharing formula.

Question	Norway	Chile	Botswana	Alaska	Mongolia (2026)
Fund size	~US$2.5 trillion	FEES US$3.9 billion	Pula Fund (US$4.1 billion in 2022)	US$85+ billion	~US$2.3 billion
Spending rule	Real return ~3%	Structural balance, long-term copper price	SBI: recurrent spending from non-mineral revenue	5% of five-year average	Fiscal Stability Law (structural balance); no clear numeric withdrawal rule for the fund
Who sets prices and parameters	Parliament, Ministry of Finance	Independent expert committees	Ministry of Finance	Legislators	To be clarified
State stake	Equinor 67%, SDFI	Codelco 100%	Debswana 50%	None directly	Oyu Tolgoi 34%, Erdenes Mongol
How citizens benefit	Budget (27%) → public services	Budget + three regional funds	Education, health, infrastructure	Annual cash (US$1,200)	Personal savings account (locked until 2030)
Local share	Through the national budget	US$450m a year by formula	Through the national budget	State budget	Bill under discussion
Key lesson	Spend the return, not the capital	Decouple the budget from the price cycle	Joint venture + diversification	Citizen ownership + politicisation risk	Legislate rules and independence

Sources are in each country section; Pula Fund figure: Centurion.

A three-phase path for Mongolia

Combining the best of the four models for Mongolia: first protect the rules, then formalise distribution, then renew contracts and diversify.

Phase	Action	Model	Owner
1. Protect the rules (0–12 months)	Legislate a numeric withdrawal rule (fixed share of five-year average assets)	Norway, Alaska	Parliament, Ministry of Finance
	Create an independent expert committee to set long-term copper and coal prices	Chile	Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Council
	Require a majority of independent members on the fund board; publish quarterly reports	Norway, Chile	Parliament, Chinggis Fund
2. Formalise distribution (1–2 years)	Share a fixed part of royalties by formula among aimags, the poorest soums and mining soums	Chile	Parliament, Government
	Set Savings Fund use (housing, education, health) in law and remove it from the annual budget fight	Alaska (lesson)	Parliament
	Add an SBI-style test to budget law: recurrent spending covered by non-mining revenue	Botswana	Ministry of Finance
3. Renew contracts and diversify (2–5 years)	Publish strategic deposit contracts	Chile, Norway	Ministry of Mining
	A small professional holder of state stakes (Petoro-style)	Norway	Erdenes Mongol
	In renewals, negotiate marketing rights and contributions to a diversification fund	Botswana	Government

This path is a policy proposal, not a legal opinion; each phase needs detailed work with lawyers, economists and fund specialists.

Sources

Mongolia

• MLSP — A savings account for every citizen
• Chinggis Fund — Savings Fund
• GlobalSWF — GSR 2026: Chinggis Khaan SWF
• MI24 — the 60% strategic-deposit bill
• Open Society Forum — Policy brief No. 50
• Rio Tinto 20-F 2025
• Mining News — Oyu Tolgoi underground mine

Norway

• Norsk Petroleum — The government's revenues
• Norsk Petroleum — Management of revenues
• Norsk Petroleum — State organisation of petroleum activities
• Government of Norway — Meld. St. 7 (2025–2026)
• Norges Bank — Investor presentation, September 2026

Chile

• NRGI — 2017 Resource Governance Index, Chile
• BIS — Fiscal rule and central bank issues in Chile
• DLA Piper — Mining Royalty Act
• InvestChile — Mining royalty key facts
• Hacienda — FEES
• Dipres — FEES report, May 2026

Botswana

• IDEX — De Beers Botswana deal
• Jewellery News — sales agreement 2025
• CCSI — Botswana Pula Fund
• IMF — 2025 Article IV mission
• Your Botswana — diamond price slump

Alaska

• Alaska Beacon — 2026 PFD
• BusinessWire — APFC
• Alaska Legislature — SB 26
• Juneau Empire — PFD 2025